Abstract-Elliptic curves are some specific type of curves known as hyper elliptic curves. Compared to the integer factorization problem(IFP) based systems, using elliptic curve based cryptography will significantly decrease key size of the encryption. Therefore, application of this type of cryptography in systems that need high security and smaller key size has found great attention. Hyperelliptic curves help to make key length shorter. Many investigations are done with regard to improving computations, hardware and software implementation of these curves, their security and resistance against attacks. This paper studies and analyzes researches done about security and efficiency of hyperelliptic curves.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hyper elliptic curves are being used in many important research fields like pseudo random numbers generators [21] , coding theory [4, 10, 20] , number theory algorithms [1, 18, 19] and cryptography [22, 23, 24, 25, 26] .
In 1989, Koblitz suggested using hyper elliptic curves instead of elliptic curves in order to design cryptography systems based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Hyperelliptic curves are expanded forms of elliptic curves. In other words, an elliptic curve is a hyperelliptic curve of genus 1. Having a short key size is the main advantage of hyper elliptic curves. It means that a hyper elliptic curve needs a smaller finite field to reach some level of security compared with an elliptic curve.
Further, group order of a hyperelliptic curve of genus g on a finite field with q element(s) is g q . So, in order to make a group of the order 160 2 by using an elliptic curve, one needs a finite field with 160 2 elements. Whereas to make the same group using hyperelliptic curves of genus 2, only one finite field with 80 2 elements will be needed. Likewise, for hyper elliptic curves of genus 3 and 4 a finite field with respectively 53 2 and 51 2 elements will be required [25] .
Of course, regarding researches done on hyper elliptic curves of genus 4, 5, 6, … these curves have a lower security level [14] . Contrary to elliptic curves which do not allow using index calculus algorithm for solving discrete logarithm problem, on hyperelliptic curves this attack is possible; which is considered a major shortcoming for them. Regarding the complexity of computations on hyperelliptic curves, it is very important to find appropriate hyperelliptic curves and improving their computations in order to make cryptography systems based on these curves applicable. Today, hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 and 3 can be efficiently obtained so that the resulted group will have an almost prime order. 
is a polynomial of the maximum degree g, and     ‫و‬ is a special point.
Here is a method of computing number of group members resulted from a hyperelliptic curve. Consider J the Jacobin of a hyperelliptic curve C defined on q F . 
III. ATTACKS
There are some attacks aimed at hyperelliptic curves. 10 years after Koblitz introduced hyperelliptic curves to cryptography (Diffie-Hellman key exchange) the best attacks of discrete logarithm problem for these curves were square root algorithms. Square roots algorithms are public key algorithms used for solving discrete logarithm problem in every group including shank's baby-step giant-step, Pollard and Pohlig-Hellman algorithms. Running time for the first and the second algorithms is radical of the group size and running time for the third algorithm is square root of the largest prime factor of the group order. Because in cryptography applications the group's order is prime or almost prime, so, all these algorithms have square root time. The first index calculus algorithm to solve discrete logarithm problem on the Jacobin of a hyperelliptic curve was introduced in [2] . Also, the guidance account attack offered in [14] was the first instance of a public attack to the discrete logarithm problem defined on the Jacobin of low-genus hyperelliptic curves which had a shorter running time than the group order's square root. These definitions and theorems are needed. [11, 12] . It shows that almost all genus 3-hyper elliptic curves are weaker than the elliptic curves. Therefore, it is possible to say that for hyper elliptic curves of genus 4 g  index calculus attack can be done.
As a result, they are not appropriate to be used in public key cryptography. In case of using them, the group size must be well increased. Also, among hyper elliptic curves of other genus i.e. 1, 2,3 g  , for g=3, the group size must be selected in a way to prevent index calculus attacks offered in [33] .
One other current attack for hyperelliptic curves is the descent Weil attack. This attack happens either if there is a composite finite field i.e. However, in such a case, using GHS algorithms and their improvements [15] , the discrete logarithm problem can be solved. So, to prevent this attack, the curve must either be defined on a prime finite field p F or a finite field m p F in which m is a prime number and order of number 2 in the multiplication group of p mode is a large number i.e. in relation 2 1 mod t p  , t is a large number. 2 Security Level [34] As it is clear, in hardware implementation for a security level of 160 2 , the genus 2-hyperelliptic curves are more efficient than hyper elliptic curves of genus 3; whereas with a security level of 180 2 it is the other way round [35] .
Before this, it was generally agreed that because computations of genus 4-hyperelliptic curves were much more costly than hyper elliptic curves of smaller genus, hyper elliptic curves were not appropriate for application. While new findings show that for applications with lower security levels, genus 4-hyperelliptic curves are faster than genus 2-hyperelliptic curves. Moreover, it not only is as efficient as hyperelliptic curves of g=3 but also, can replace elliptic curves. In addition, in hardware implementation of applications with a lower security level like in groups with order 128 2 , computations of hyper elliptic curves of genus g=4 are almost 1.46 times faster than that of hyperelliptic curves of g=2. It also uses the same efficiency as hyperelliptic curves of g=3. It is also noteworthy that compared with hyper elliptic curves of g=2, 3, hyperelliptic curves of g=4 are more appropriate to be implemented in embedded microprocessors than general processors. To gain a security level of 128 2 , a hyper elliptic curve of g=4 can be defined on the finite field 32 
2
F . Thus implementing these curves on 32-bit processors will be really efficient. It will be more efficient than hyperelliptic curves of g=2 and almost equally efficient as hyperelliptic curves of g=3. Usually, when using cheap embedded processors, a lower security level will be needed. In practice, a group of the order 128 2 will suffice. This security level is almost higher than that of RSA-512 [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] .
V. PAIRINGS ON HYPER ELLIPTIC CURVES
Take C as a hyperelliptic curve of genus g defined on Hyperelliptic curves whose Jacobins have a small embedding degree and a subgroup with big prime order are appropriate to be used in paring functions. They are called pairing friendly [3, 13] . In practical application values of 160 2 , 60 rk  are needed. Also, as mentioned earlier, the best attack at the discrete logarithm problem is the  -Pollard algorithm which is implemented in a parallel way. Running time of this algorithm is
 
Orwith r as the value of the biggest prime subgroup   q JF . For hyper curves of genus g=3, 4 there can be index calculus attacks with these respective complexities:
To compare with the paralleled  -Pollard algorithm which depends on the subgroup of the order r, it can be said if 9 8   of g=3 and also 4 3   of g=4, then the index calculus attack reaches the upper boundary of the  -Pollard attack. However, the best algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem for hyper curves of genus g=2, 3, 4 have exponential running time. On the other hand, the best algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm in a finite field is the index calculus attack which has the subexponential running time related to the field's size. . Subgroups of the prime order and expanded fields (with large discriminates) follow the NIST standard. The above table is based on g=2. For g=2, 3, 4, these procedures must be followed:
If the Jacobin order is almost prime   1   , then it is just required to arrange parameters in a way so that they can resist the index calculus attack. For g=3, the second column of the above table should be multiplied with 9 8 and the fourth column at 8 9 . For g=4, the second and the fourth columns should be multiplied respectively at 4 3 and 3 4
. Embedding degree for super singular hyper curves of genus g=2 holds true in relation 12 k  . For general hyper elliptic curves of genus g=2 in specific cases, it also holds true in relation 12 k  . The quickest implementation of pairing functions has been offered for the pairing T  which uses a super singular genus 2-hyper elliptic curve defined on a finite field with the discriminate 2. Embedding degree of this case is 12 .The results reached at by [28]  Computing the pairing function on genus 3-hyper curves is very inefficient than that of genus 2-hyper curves.
 Implementation time of a pairing function on genus 2-hyper curves defined on p F is almost two times longer than implementation time of a pairing on hyper elliptic curves defined on p F . To decrease this time distance, it is essential to use super singular genus 2-hyperelliptic curves.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current paper introduced hyper elliptic curves. It also offered comparisons between different types of these curves regarding their security and efficiency. Therefore, it can briefly be concluded that index calculus attack is possible for hyperelliptic curves of 5 g  .So, they are not appropriate to be used in public key cryptography. In applications with no need of a high security level like WSN with low-cost embedded processors that use cryptography algorithms with smaller key size, hyper elliptic curves of genus 2,3, 4 g  can be applied.
